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The frequent failure of financial liberalisation efforts in developing countries, and 
the serious damage which recent financial crises have imposed on these economies, have 
led to renewed attempts to understand the relationships between financial sector 
development, economic growth and poverty reduction, and to provide a more robust 
intellectual foundation on which to design efficient and pro-poor financial sector policies 
for developing countries. 
The paper examines the contribution that financial sector development can make to 
poverty reduction in developing countries. The linkages between financial and economic 
growth, and between economic growth and poverty reduction, are considered, and some 
preliminary empirical evidence is presented on these linkages. The paper goes on to 
argue that financial market imperfections are a key constraint on pro-poor growth, and 
that public policy directed at the correction of these financial market failures is needed to 
ensure that financial development contributes effectively to growth and poverty 
reduction. The final part of the paper examines in some detail the role of financial 
regulation and supervision policy as a key area for public intervention directed at 
enhancing the financial sector’s contribution to poverty reduction. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
There is a longstanding tradition in economics with the issue of financial 
development and economic growth.  Goldsmith (1969) stressed the connection 
between a country’s financial superstructure and its real infrastructure, arguing that 
the former ‘accelerates economic growth and improves economic performance to the 
extent that it facilitates the migration of funds to the best user i.e. to the place in the 
economic system where the funds will yield the highest social return’ (p. 400).  In 
one of the earliest studies to use cross country empirical analysis, Goldsmith 
presented data showing a positive trend in the ratio of financial institutions’ assets to 
gross national product for developed and developing countries.  
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Fifty years on, development finance again occupies a central position in 
development economics research and practice.  A wave of financial liberalisation in 
the latter half of the 1980s and early 1990s and a surge of capital inflows to many 
developing countries, were followed by financial crises in Latin America and East 
Asia.  These events have fostered a fresh research interest in the role of financial 
intermediation in economic development, and a re-examination of the policy options 
for ensuring that the financial sector’s contribution to economic growth and 
development is fully realised. The road from the early work on finance and 
development to where we are now, however, has not been a straight one. Our 
understanding of the underlying relationships has improved, but remains incomplete.  
Policy lessons have been learnt, but often on the basis of costly mistakes in previous 
policy choices and strategic decisions. 
In this paper I will review the recent research contributions in the area of 
finance, growth and development, and will try to uncover what we now know about 
the contribution that financial sector development can make to poverty reduction.  I 
will focus particularly on the role of public policy in fostering financial sector 
development, something that was strongly emphasised in the early development 
economics literature but became marginalised in the market liberalisation orthodoxy 
of more recent times. 
 
FINANCE AND POVERTY REDUCTION 
The International Development Targets (IDTs) agreed by the United Nations 
membership following a series of summit meetings held by the UN and its 
specialised agencies over the past ten years or so, commit the international 
community to achieving sustainable development by the target date of 2015.  The 
IDT for poverty reduction aims to half the proportion of people living in absolute 
poverty, and will involve reducing the proportion of people living below a dollar a 
day from 30 percent to 15 percent of the developing world’s population. 
Can financial sector development contribute to poverty reduction?  In the 
early development economics literature there was, at best, an assumption of an 
indirect link between financial sector development and a general improvement in the 
average standard of living, to the extent that financial sector development supported 
economic growth.  But with the failure of economic growth to deliver sustained 
improvements in the living standards of the poor, this benign-neglect approach to 
financial sector development (FSD) was replaced by a more negative view of the 
indirect link between finance and poverty (or, at least, income distribution), based on 
the perceived failure of government policy towards the financial sector. The financial 
repression argument blamed excessive government interventions for the emergence 
of a segmented credit market in which favoured borrowers obtained directed credit at 
subsidised rates of interest, while less privileged borrowers were forced to seek 
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adopted by developing countries in the 1980s, was intended to lead to financial 
deepening and better access to credit for previously marginalised borrowers and 
savers [Gibson and Tsakalotos (1994); Cull (1997)]. The theoretical underpinning for 
financial liberalisation was provided by McKinnon (1973) and Shaw (1973), who 
emphasised the influence of real interest rates on savings, investment and hence 
growth.  Ex post assessment of financial liberalisation suggests, however, that the 
expected improvements in economic growth, increased financial depth and widened 
access to credit, have not occurred. There is also evidence consistent with the 
hypothesis that financial liberalisation has led to an increase in financial fragility and 
systemic crises in developing countries’ financial sector. 
The financial ‘repression’ and ‘liberalisation’ approaches had a common 
concern with economic growth and resource allocation, with little consideration for 
the poverty impact, other than in implicit assumption that the benefits of economic 
growth would ‘trickle-down’ to the lower income groups. 
Micro-finance has been promoted as a means of directly linking finance and 
poverty reduction.  The belief that micro-finance institutions can both alleviate 
poverty and be financially sustainable has been translated into ‘best practice’ 
technologies which have been widely disseminated by the support of the 
Consultative Group to Assist the Poorest (CGAP) and other key donors.  These 
initiatives have concentrated, however, on the technology of improving access to 
credit rather than on measuring the impact on poverty and as Mosley and Hulme 
[(1998), p. 784] note, ‘the assumption that improved access to credit will reduce 
poverty has seldom been tested, with the fact that small loans are being made taken 
as proof that the poor are being reached and the fact that loans are being repaid as 
proof that incomes have increased’. Furthermore, even where micro-finance 
institutions are successful in helping the poor, these savings and credit services can 
only reach a tiny proportion of the poor.  Providing effective micro-finance services 
to poor people is part of a poverty-reduction strategy—but only a small part. 
 
Pro-Poor Financial Development 
Economic growth is necessary for a sustained and widespread reduction in 
poverty.  The argument that economic growth systematically makes poor people 
relatively worse off by widening inequalities is not supported by recent empirical 
evidence which shows that in recent decades, economic growth has on average been 
as likely to reduce income inequality as to increase it.  Even when income inequality 
has worsened with high growth, the negative effect on the poor has generally been 
outweighed by the positive impact of growth in raising income levels [Deininger and 
Squire (1996); Goudie and Ladd (1999)].  The recent study by Dollar and Kraay 
(2000) based on observations from 80 countries over four decades finds a roughly 
one to one relationship between overall growth in per capita GDP and percentage 
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The argument that economic growth is necessary for poverty reduction does 
not mean that policy-makers can limit their attention to the single target of growth 
maximisation [Lipton and Ravallion (1995)].  The extent to which a given rate of 
economic growth affects poverty levels is influenced by the institutional structure 
and policy environment that exists in particular countries.  As Goudie and Ladd 
[(1999), p. 191] note, ‘some patterns of growth are more effective than others in 
reducing poverty, and should be actively fostered.  There will be growth patterns that 
have greater participation of the poor, allowing them to benefit from the growth of 
the national economy.  Hence, for maximum impact on poverty, pro-poor patterns of 
growth should be promoted’.  Pro-poor growth builds on productive use of the assets 
of the poor, and improved access to markets.  Public policies which reduce market 
imperfections and thereby widen access and enhance the productive endowments and 
capabilities which poor people need to take advantage of opportunities in a growing 
market economy, will be key factors in promoting pro-poor growth. 
A growing body of theoretical and empirical research has confirmed the view 
that the development of financial markets and institutions is a critical part of the 
economic growth process.  Stiglitz (1998) likens the financial system to the ‘brain’ 
of the economy, performing the function of allocating resources across space and 
time in an environment of uncertainty. These financial functions of mobilising 
savings, allocating resources and facilitating risk management contribute to 
economic growth by supporting capital accumulation and technological innovation. 
Cross-country analysis has been used extensively to examine the relationship 
between financial development and economic growth.  The findings in King and 
Levine (1993) are representative of this body by literature: ‘higher levels of financial 
development are significantly and robustly correlated with faster current and future 
rates of economic growth, physical capital accumulation and economic efficiency 
improvements’ (pp. 717-18). 
The direction of causality between financial sector development and 
economic growth has long been contested between those who argue that financial 
development is driven by economic growth, responding to the demands for 
financial services, and those who maintain that the supply of financial services 
leads to economic growth.  Recent econometric analysis using large, cross-country 
time series data sets has provided fresh evidence on the linkage between financial 
development and economic growth [Luintel and Khan (1999); Levine (2000)].   
While confirming earlier findings that the causality runs in both directions, the use 
of more sophisticated econometric methods has allowed research to identify the 
strength of each uni-directional link. The study by Levine, Loayza and Beck 
(2000) is representative of this body of literature, concluding that ‘both cross 
section and panel data results tell the same story: financial intermediary 
development exerts a statistically significant and economically large impact on 
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Additional evidence of the link between financial development and economic 
performance is found in the adverse impact which financial crises and systemic 
instability have on the real economy.  The total cost of the 59 banking crises in 
developing countries from 1976–1996, that is, before the East Asia financial crisis, 
was estimated to be $250 billion [Caprio and Honohan (1999), p. 44], an average of 
almost 10 percent of GDP.  For the East Asian crisis countries, estimates are in the 
range 20-55 percent of GDP.  The contraction of credit and general deterioration in 
financial services in turn have an adverse effect on investment decisions and hence 
on economic growth in the longer run. 
The argument so far has been a familiar one and can be briefly summarised.  
Economic growth is essential for poverty reduction.  But policy intervention is 
needed if economic growth is to deliver increased income and improved economic 
security to the poor.  We also know that financial sector development contributes to 
economic growth.  But the linkage between financial sector development and 
economic growth will be affected by the efficiency of the financial sector’s support 
to capital accumulation and technological innovation. 
Recent research on the determinants of financial sector performance and 
growth has served to identify the various factors which can influence financial 
intermediation efficiency and growth-enhancing financial sector development 
[Levine et al. (2000); Barth et al. (2000)]. 
The macroeconomic environment affects the efficiency of the financial sector.  
Banks are vulnerable, particularly in developing countries, to volatility in terms of 
trade, exchange rates and interest rates, with macroeconomic shocks contributing to 
banking crises, with sudden changes in relative prices undermining the value of 
banks’ asset portfolios [Kaminsky and Reinhart (1998); Demirguc-Kunt and 
Detragiache (1997)].  The institutional characteristics of the financial infrastructure 
may also contribute to effective financial market functioning.  This includes aspects 
such as the legal framework, information disclosure and availability, and accounting 
and auditing practices.  Levine et al. (2000), for example, show that cross-country 
differences in legal systems and accounting standards help account for cross-country 
differences in the level of financial development, and argue that legal changes which 
strengthen creditor rights, contract enforcement and better use of accounting 
practice, will all contribute to improving financial intermediation and more rapid 
economic growth. 
A major determinant of financial sector performance is the prudential 
financial regulation and supervision environment within which the financial 
institutions operate.  Recent empirically-based research has begun to devise cross-
country indicators of regulatory practices and provides support for the view that the 
strength of the prudential regulation policy framework has a significant impact on 
the stability and economic performance of the financial sector [Williamson and 
Mahar (1998); Lingren, Garcia and Saul (1996); Rossi (1999); Barth, Caprio and 
Levine (2000); Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache (1999)]. Colin Kirkpatrick  368
FINANCIAL REGULATION IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 
In developing countries, the banks constitute almost the entire financial sector.  
A strong banking system is therefore the sine qua non for a robust financial sector.  
Before the 1980s, LDCs did not accord a high priority to the prudential regulation 
and supervision of their financial systems, for two reasons.  First, government policy 
emphasised economic regulation, such as controls over interest rates and the sectoral 
allocation of credit, because governments throughout the developing world were 
keen to use controls over the financial system to promote economic, social and 
political objectives [Long and Vittas (1992)].  Second, many LDCs, especially those 
in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), had inherited banking and regulatory systems from the 
colonial era in which the need for supervision by domestic regulators was limited 
because banks were largely owned by established and reputable foreign banks, were 
conservatively managed and subject to strict prudential controls from their parent 
banks [Polizatto (1992)].  However, the fragility which emerged in the financial 
systems of many LDCs in the 1980s exposed the inadequacy of their prudential 
systems in the face of changes to the structure of their financial systems, notably in 
the ownership of banks.  Supervisory departments were often grossly understaffed, 
and focused not on prudential issues but on enforcing economic regulations, such as 
compliance with foreign exchange controls.  The banking laws were outdated and 
inadequate: for example, they gave supervisors little independence, and minimum 
capital requirements had often been eroded by inflation to negligible real levels.  
Many financial institutions (FIs), such as public sector FIs set up by statute, were not 
subject to banking laws or to supervision by the regulatory authorities [Brownbridge 
and Harvey (1998); World Bank (1989)]. 
LDCs began to implement major reforms to their prudential systems in the 
1980s and early 1990s.  These reforms were in many cases stimulated by the 
financial crises which had occurred in the 1980s and/or were part of broader 
programmes of financial sector reforms funded by loans from the World Bank or 
other multilateral agencies. Conditionalities related to bank regulation and 
supervision featured prominently in World Bank financial sector adjustment loans, 
with a higher probability of inclusion than interest rate deregulation, bank 
privatisation of directed credit reforms [Cull (1997)]. 
Prudential reforms followed a broadly similar pattern, although the details and 
scope of the reforms varied between countries.  An industrial country (in particular 
the US) model of regulation and supervision has been adopted by most LDCs.  In 
referring to the regulatory model as US inspired, we are taking account of specific 
features of the US model, notably the formal regulations and regular on-site bank 
examinations conducted by the regulators, which distinguish it from the regulatory 
systems which existed on the continent and in the UK.  The UK model was used to 
be essentially informal and discretionary and did not involve on-site inspections by 
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upon external auditors rather than public regulators for on-site examination of banks 
[Polizatto (1992)].  The Basle Committee’s Core Principles for Effective Banking 
Supervision, drawn up in 1997, sets out the basic framework of this model [IMF 
(1998)].  The model involves a set of detailed prudential regulations, set out in the 
banking law (e.g. minimum requirements for capital to risk assets, restrictions on 
banks’ asset portfolios including restrictions on large loan exposures and insider 
lending, auditing requirements etc.), with supervision undertaken directly by a public 
agency.  Supervision entails on-site inspections and off-site monitoring of banks 
based around the CAMEL principles, in which supervisors evaluate a bank according 
to its capital asset quality, management, earnings and liquidity [Sheng (1996a)].   
Supervisors aim to inspect banks at regular intervals and banks are required to 
submit regular financial reports to the supervisors.  Some, but not all, LDCs have 
also adopted some type of deposit insurance [Kyei (1995)].  Prudential reforms have 
also included considerable institutional strengthening, albeit from very low levels of 
institutional capacity in many cases.  Staffing levels have been expanded, training 
provided for supervisors, and technical advisors provided to supervisory authorities. 
 
WEAKNESSES IN PRUDENTIAL SYSTEMS 
Many LDCs suffered banking crises during the mid to late 1990s, often 
several years after they had begun to implement prudential reforms.  There have 
been three main sources of weakness in the reformed LDC prudential systems.  First, 
some banking legislations still omit important prudential restrictions, or include 
provisions which are not strict or precise enough. Second, some regulatory 
authorities lack the requisite personnel to carry out effective supervision.  Third, 
supervisors have been unable, or unwilling, to rigorously enforce the prudential 
regulations. 
In some countries, legislation was not strict or comprehensive enough to deal 
with problems that emerged in the 1990s.  For example, the minimum capital 
requirements in the legislation enacted by several countries in SSA were set at levels 
that allowed many undercapitalised banks, lacking adequate financial or managerial 
resources, to be set up in the 1990s, which subsequently failed as a result of mis-
management and fraud [Brownbridge (1998)]. 
The East Asian financial crisis exposed a number of regulatory weaknesses in 
the countries most badly affected by the crisis.  Loan classification and provisioning 
rules were too lenient, especially for secured loans: they were much less stringent 
than international standards.  Consequently, bad debt provisions in East Asian 
countries were inadequate to provide cover against likely losses, which meant that 
earnings and capital levels were overstated, and the minimum capital adequacy 
requirements, which were based on the Basle standard, were rendered meaningless 
[Brownbridge and Kirkpatrick (1999); Folkerts-Landau et al. (1995), pp. 39-40].   
The failure of banks to make proper provisions for their non performing assets, either Colin Kirkpatrick  370
because the provisioning rules were not strict enough or because the rules were not 
complied with, has been a problem in many countries besides those in East Asia. 
A further omission from the banking regulations in several of the East Asian 
countries was the absence of restrictions on excessive exposure to high risk sectors, 
such as real estate.  Also, while most of the East Asian countries did impose 
restrictions on banks’ foreign exchange exposures, the regulations did not prevent 
banks from borrowing in foreign currency and on lending these funds as foreign 
currency loans to non-traded goods sectors, such as real estate, which were highly 
vulnerable to a depreciation of the exchange rate.  This banks were able to comply 
with foreign exchange exposure regulations by transferring foreign exchange risk 
into credit risk which was not adequately restricted by the prudential regulations.  
Although the banking regulations in East Asia included restrictions on insider 
lending and large loan exposures, poor accounting standards in several East Asian 
countries assisted banks to evade these restrictions [Alba et al. (1998); Rahman 
(1998)]. Finally, many of the non bank financial institutions (NBFIs), such as finance 
companies in Thailand and merchant banks in Korea, which failed in the 1997-98 
crisis had been subject to less strict prudential regulation, and weaker supervision, 
than banks. 
While supervisory capacities have been expanded as a result of prudential 
reforms, in some countries the demands on supervisors have grown faster than 
supervisory capacity, because deregulation has allowed a rapid pace of new entry of 
banks and deposit taking NBFIs.  In some countries, where the numbers of banks 
and/or NBFIs multiplied within the space of a few years (Nigeria in the late 1980s 
and Indonesia since 1987 are examples), it is difficult to envisage how supervisory 
capacities could have been expanded quickly enough to keep pace with the growing 
demand. Moreover, it is the new entrants, which are often small and lack 
experienced management, that are most in need of close supervision.  However, as 
Caprio (1996) points out, it would take many LDCs five to ten years to train their 
bank supervisors to the levels of expertise of the industrial countries.  The data in 
Mehran  et al. (1998: Appendix Table A4) indicate that, with the exception of 
Mauritius and Tanzania, the average experience of bank supervisors in SSA 
countries is between two and five years.  The type of skills needed by supervisors are 
scarce in LDCs and because of financial constraints in the public sector, supervisory 
departments often struggle to retain skilled staff in the face of competition from the 
private sector. 
The weak enforcement of prudential regulations by the regulators—known as 
regulatory forbearance—is described by Honohan (1997) as the ‘Achilles’ heel of 
any regulatory system’. Regulatory forbearance is often the result of political 
pressure on the regulatory authorities, who are reluctant to alienate the politicians 
who appoint and oversee them.  It may also be attributable to ‘regulatory capture’ or 
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affects on their reputation and career prospects [Boot and Thakor (1993)].  It is, 
however, difficult to empirically assess the extent of regulatory forbearance because 
much of the actual practice of bank supervision is not publicly observable, given that 
a degree of confidentiality is essential to maintaining public confidence in the 
banking system and the trust of the bankers.  In many cases the extent of regulatory 
forbearance only becomes apparent after major bank failures occur, and information 
on the events leading up to the failure is made public. 
Regulatory forbearance takes a number of forms, for example, regulators may 
not strictly enforce loan classification requirements or loan exposure limits, but it 
becomes particularly crucial when regulators have to deal with distressed banks.   
Regulators often face strong pressures to delay taking action, especially when this 
involves closing a bank because the political costs of bank closures may be high.  
The mechanisms for dealing with distressed banks set out in banking legislation 
often lack precision and clarity, with regulators given too much discretion: this was 
an important weakness in the prudential legislation of many of the East Asian crisis 
countries.  Intervention policy is, as a consequence, often determined on an ad hoc 
basis, which exposes the supervisors to pressure to exercise forbearance.   
Consequently, distressed banks are often allowed more time and liquidity support 
from the Central Bank in the hope that they can resolve their financial distress.  A 
mutual dependence between the regulators and the distressed bank may then 
develop, whereby the distressed bank requires more finance to remain liquid while it 
becomes increasingly difficult for regulators to close the bank and realise the losses 
at the expense of the taxpayer [Glaessner and Mas (1995)].  Moreover, distressed 
banks have fewer incentives for prudent management as they have little, if any, 
capital left to lose.  Instead bank owners have incentives to ‘gamble for resurrection’ 
with what is left of their deposits and the liquidity support they are able to obtain 
from authorities.  The result is often an escalation of losses in what have been 
dubbed ‘zombie banks’; banks which are insolvent but remain open with liquidity 
support from the authorities [Kane (1989)].  Regulatory forbearance worsens moral 
hazard since, if regulators acquire a reputation for forbearance, bank owners and 
managers will have less reason to fear that imprudent management will be penalised, 
and therefore will be less constrained in taking imprudent risks. 
Although weak implementation of prudential reforms clearly accounts for 
some of the deficiencies which still afflict the prudential systems of LDCs, there 
must also be doubts over whether a regulatory model designed for advanced 
economies is optimal for LDCs [Caprio (1996, 1997)].  Caprio points out that the 
high incidence of banking crisis in industrialised countries does not necessarily 
suggest that their regulatory methodology should be regarded as ‘international best 
practice’, and argues that it is unrealistic to expect supervision to act as the first line 
of defence against bank failures in LDCs given the constraints which supervisors 
face in these countries: e.g. severe scarcities of the requisite skills, the length of time Colin Kirkpatrick  372
needed to train supervisors, political interference and weak accounting and legal 
frameworks.  The industrial country regulatory model is highly intensive in the use 
of reliable financial information and professional supervisory capacities, both of 
which are in short supply in most LDCs. It also relies upon a regulator which can 
enforce prudential regulations consistently and impartially, whereas in many LDCs 
regulators have neither the incentives nor the political independence to do this. 
A further drawback of the industrial country model of prudential regulation for 
LDCs is its complexity in that it comprises many different components which depend 
for their effectiveness upon other components of the model also working properly: in 
other words, the different components do not stand alone, but form part of an 
interlocking system.  If one part of the system fails, the effectiveness of the whole 
system is impaired.  The capital adequacy requirement, for example, which is a central 
component of the model, is not effective as a prudential tool unless banks accurately 
value their assets. This in turn requires that proper accounting rules must be in place 
and that regulators, or external auditors, have the capacities to evaluate the condition of 
banks’ asset portfolios and the adequacy of their loan loss provisions.  Restrictions on 
risk taking, such as limits on insider lending, are also ineffective if regulators do not 
have sufficient supervisory capacity to examine banks’ portfolios and detect 
infringements.  In some LDCs, gross violations of the banking laws, such as insider 
lending amounting to a multiple of the statutory limit, have not been detected by 
regulators, or by external auditors, until after a bank has been closed. 
 
Making Prudential Regulation in Developing 
    Countries More Effective 
A range of proposals and approaches have been advocated in the literature for 
making prudential regulation more effective in developing countries [Caprio and 
Honohan (1999); Honohan and Stiglitz (1999); Murshed and Subagjo (2000); 
Brownbridge and Kirkpatrick (2000)]. 
One approach involves building upon the model for prudential regulation 
currently in place in most LDCs, by enacting reforms to introduce regulations 
covering types of risk not adequately covered in the existing regulations, by making 
regulations more stringent where appropriate to take account of the prevailing 
conditions in LDCs’ financial markets, and by further institutional strengthening of 
supervisory authorities.  Other approaches involve some reversal of financial 
liberalisation in order to restrain competition in banking markets, while others would 
seek greater reliance on market based solutions.  The approaches are not entirely 
mutually exclusive. 
 
Strengthening Capital Requirements 
As noted above, most LDCs have adopted bank capital requirements based on 
the Basle Capital Accord.  Dziobeck, Frecaut and Nieto (1995) argue that stricter Financial Development and Poverty Reduction  373
capital regulations are needed in LDCs because the risks facing their banking 
systems are greater than in the industrialised countries as a result of a less stable 
economic environment and less developed financial infrastructures.  LDCs should, 
therefore, consider adopting higher minimum capital adequacy requirements than the 
8 percent of risk adjusted assets specified in the Basle Accord.  Singapore and 
Argentina have adopted capital adequacy requirements of 12 percent and 11.5 
percent respectively.  Moreover, other elements of the capital adequacy requirement 
need to be reviewed.  For example, the risk weights given to different types of loans 
are based on observed default probabilities in industrialised countries, which may be 
too low if applied to LDCs. 
Higher capital requirements cannot compensate however, for deficiencies in 
other prudential norms, such as inadequate provisioning.  Furthermore, bank capital 
in LDCs is often elastic and of poor quality because bank owners are able to finance 
their equity holdings by borrowing from their own bank, hence in such cases raising 
capital requirements would neither reduce incentives for risk taking nor provide a 
buffer against losses [Goodhart et al. (1998), pp. 107-8].  Even if capital adequacy 
standards could be effectively enforced, some models of banking behaviour suggest 
that in some circumstances raising regulatory capital requirements may be 
ineffective in reducing risk taking on the part of banks or may even induce greater 
risk taking [Bhattacharya and Thakor (1992); Gilbert (1991)]. 
 
Tighter Lending Restrictions 
Rapid credit growth in the mid-1990s characterised the East Asian financial 
systems hit by the 1997-98 crisis.  Over rapid expansion of lending banks is often a 
cause of poor asset quality because the growth of lending may outstrip the lender’s 
capacity to appraise and monitor its borrowers and also because more marginal 
borrowers are likely to be brought into the credit market, but prudential regulations 
in most countries do not place restrictions on credit growth, other than indirectly 
through the capital adequacy requirement.  Honohan [(1997), p. 21] advocates ‘speed 
limits’ to restrict the rate of growth of banks’ loan portfolios.  He envisages that 
these would be used in markets with many new and inexperienced entrants, or to 
dampen a credit boom, but does not envisage their use as a tool of regulation on a 
permanent basis.  Speed limits need not necessarily be applied to the entire loan 
portfolio, but could be restricted to the types of lending, such as real estate or foreign 
currency loans, which are regarded as posing the greatest risk to banks’ financial 
soundness and which often grow rapidly after financial liberalisation.  LDCs should 
also impose very strict limits on insider lending. 
 
Financial Restraint 
Hellman, Murdock and Stiglitz (1998) advocate deposit rate controls as a tool 
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financial liberalisation has contributed to financial fragility because it reduces banks’ 
franchise values and thus incentives for prudent bank management.  They model a 
banking market with freely determined deposit rates of interest in which, although 
raising capital requirements can induce more prudent bank management, this is not 
Pareto efficient because banks are compelled to hold an inefficiently large amount of 
capital.  Even a market without deposit insurance and with perfect monitoring by 
depositors may still be subject to moral hazard if deposit rates are freely determined, 
because there exist equilibria where banks have an incentive to gamble and can still 
attract deposits by paying higher deposit rates.  In their model an efficient Pareto 
outcome can be induced through a combination of deposit rate controls as part of a 
wider strategy of regulations, including restrictions on entry into banking markets, 
which create rents for banks and which they term ‘financial restraint’.  These rents 
enhance the franchise value of banks, thereby encouraging more prudent bank 
management, as well as encouraging greater deposit mobilisation by banks. 
 
Intervention Rules 
To prevent regulatory forbearance, Glaessner and Mas (1995) advocate 
institutionalising intervention policy in a clear set of publicly announced rules which 
would limit the discretion of the regulators.  An example of such rules is the US 
Prompt Correction Action (PCA) regulations, which specify graduated intervention 
by the regulators triggered by thresholds linked to capital adequacy.  The PCA 
regulations are derived from the concept of ‘structured early intervention and 
resolution’ and attempt to imitate the remedial actions which private bondholders 
would impose on debtors, in the absence of any government insurance or guarantees 
[Goldstein and Turner (1996), p. 51].  The value of PCA regulations is threefold.  
First, PCA forces regulators to intervene in a distressed bank before the level of 
distress becomes severe.  Hence the chances of successfully resolving the distress are 
higher than if intervention were to be delayed until the financial condition of the 
bank had worsened.  Second, PCA regulations impose a legal requirement on the 
regulators to take specified actions and thus improve incentives on regulators to 
intervene promptly.  They also provide regulators with a defence against political 
pressure for forbearance.  Third, by making PCA regulations part of the banking law, 
bank owners and managers will have less reason to believe that regulators will 
exercise forbearance in the event that their bank becomes distressed i.e. the existence 
of rules will enhance the credibility of the regulators as enforcers of the regulations.  
This will therefore improve incentives for prudent bank management. 
There are, however, practical difficulties with implementing PCA rules in 
LDCs.  Defining robust intervention rules may be difficult.  The capital adequacy 
thresholds used in the US may not convene useful information about the true 
financial condition of a bank in an LDC because, as discussed above, an insolvent or 
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capitalised if it fails to classify its non performing loans accurately and make 
appropriate provisions.  Regulators may not know that a bank has crossed an 
intervention threshold until long after the event, by which time it may already be 
insolvent.  In addition, however strong the regulator’s commitment may be, ex ante, 
to enforcing intervention rules, such rules are time inconsistent in that, when faced 
with a major bank failure, governments often face very strong incentives to ignore 
the rules and bail out the bank rather than close it down.  For example, in the mid-
1970s the Chilean authorities repeatedly stated that they would not bail out insolvent 
banks but did so in 1977, when a large bank ran into trouble, because they feared the 
impact of its insolvency on the confidence of depositors and external creditors in the 
country’s financial system [Diaz-Alejandro (1985)]. 
While acknowledging that allowing regulators discretion can lead to excessive 
forbearance, Enoch, Stella and Khamis (1997) argue that discretion and ambiguity by 
regulators in the operation of lender of last resort (LOLR) facilities do have some 
value.  As noted above, it may not always be possible, or optimal, to enforce 
intervention riles, such as when a bank is ‘too big to fail’, in which case the rules 
lose their credibility. A rule-driven intervention policy could penalise bank 
management for problems, such as those arising from macroeconomic shocks, for 
which they are not responsible [Dewatripont and Tirole (1994), pp. 220-21].   
Furthermore it may not be desirable to publicly reveal that a bank has received 
assistance from the authorities because it might undermine public confidence in that 
bank. Enoch, Stella and Khamis distinguish between ex ante and  ex post 
transparency, and argue that some ex ante discretion in the operation of LOLR 
facilities, balanced by sanctions on those who are responsible for the bank’s distress, 
should be combined with ex post transparency in which the regulators would have to 
make full disclosure of their intervention (e.g. why, and how much, finance was 
provided? what were the results?) to the public. 
 
Autonomy and Accountability of the Regulators 
Enhancing the legal autonomy of the regulators from Government may also 
help to insulate the regulators from pressure to exercise forbearance, but it is unlikely 
to be a panacea in countries where the legal framework is weak, and hence nominally 
legally independent central bankers may have little protection in practise from 
political interference, as well as for the reasons noted above (e.g. regulators can be 
‘captured’ by the regulated).  Kane (1997) argues that it is the ability of government 
agents to conceal information from, and resist accountability to, the public which lies 
at the heart of many principal agent problems in this area.  As such, it is essential to 
make ‘the costs generated by regulatory forbearance observable so that regulators 
can be disciplined in the press and in the labour market for post government 
employment’ (p. 72).  How this could best be achieved will depend upon the specific 
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independent minded parliamentarians, bank regulators could be required to submit a 
detailed annual report on their activities, including the details of support given to 
banks and compliance with banking laws. 
 
Market-based Approaches to Regulation 
A market based approach to prudential regulations is advocated by Calomiris 
(1997) who doubts whether Government supervisors have the skill or incentives to 
identify losses incurred by banks as diligently as would private sector agents with 
their own money at risk.  Calomiris suggests imposing a requirement that banks 
finance a minimum percentage of their assets with subordinated and uninsured debt 
carrying a yield capped at a maximum rate above the riskless market rate.  To 
mobilise subordinated debt with a capped yield, banks would have to convince 
private subordinated debt holders that the quality of the bank’s asset portfolio and 
capital was adequate to justify providing such credit.  Subordinated debt holders 
would have incentives to monitor the bank, and the threat of a run by informed debt 
holders would mitigate moral hazard on the part of banks.  Argentina introduced a 
requirement that banks should finance 2 percent of total deposits in the form of 
subordinated debt, although without a maximum yield, in 1996 [Calomiris (1997), p. 
36].  However, this solution is unlikely to be feasible in low income LDCs because 
capital markets are very poorly developed, accounting standards are low and the 
veracity of audited accounts is unreliable, hence many banks would have great 
difficulty in mobilising subordinated debt from genuine private investors irrespective 
of the quality of their asset portfolio. Even if it were feasible, monitoring by 
individual creditors would not normally be socially efficient, because monitoring 
involves positive externalities. Furthermore, if a bank is insolvent or close to 
insolvency, uninsured subordinated debt takes on characteristics which are similar to 
those of equity capital, and consequently, subordinated debt holders have sub-
optimal incentives to impose conservative management on the bank to protect its 
deposits [Dewatripont and Tirole (1994), p. 219]. 
Another approach which utilises the market is to increase disclosure 
requirements of banks’ financial condition and require banks to obtain credit ratings 
from private agencies on a regular basis.  But enhanced disclosure requirements are 
unlikely to have an impact on banks’ risk taking if bank liabilities are all implicitly 
insured.  Both Chile and Argentina have enhanced disclosure requirements and 
provide less than full insurance for banks’ liabilities.  Argentina requires banks to 
make their balance sheet data publicly available on a monthly basis, requires 
quarterly external audits of banks, and requires banks to obtain ratings from two 
established private credit rating agencies [Calomiris (1997); IMF (1998a), p. 161].  
However, enhancing disclosure requirements in countries in which accounting 
standards are weak and audited accounts are unreliable is likely to have limited 
value.  Even in countries with reliable accounting and auditing standards, the Financial Development and Poverty Reduction  377
efficacy of disclosure requirements as an instrument to facilitate monitoring of banks 
by their depositors is limited.  The acquisition and use of private information about 
borrowers, in a manner which is not feasible for depositors, provides one of the key 
rationales for banks as financial intermediaries.  The type of information which 
banks use to appraise their own borrowers is not publicly observable or verifiable 
[Marquardt (1987), pp. 20-22].  Borrowers seek loans from banks partly because 
they cannot credibly transmit information about their risk profiles directly to savers.  
If this were possible, the borrowers would raise funds more cheaply directly from 
capital markets. 
LDCs have made substantial efforts to strengthen their prudential systems.  
Most now have at least the basic framework of banking laws in place and are able to 
carry out bank supervision.  This is a major improvement on the situation in the 
1980s, when in many countries very little prudential supervision actually took place 
and the banking laws were outdated and deficient.  Nevertheless, there are still many 
weaknesses in LDCs’ prudential systems.  These weaknesses include loopholes in 
the prudential regulations (which in principle should not be difficult to rectify), lack 
of adequately skilled staff and regulatory forbearance.  The latter two constraints 
reflect more fundamental problems in LDCs, notably the scarcities of human capital, 
especially in the public sector, and the difficulties in establishing efficient and 
impartial rules-based public administration insulated from political interference. 
Given these constraints, it is not yet clear whether the developed country 
model of bank regulation, based on the imposition of detailed formal regulations and 
which makes strong demands on both information, supervisory skills and the 
independence and objectivity of regulators, can be made to work effectively in 
LDCs.  The option of relying more on market based monitoring of banks does not 
appear to be feasible in low income LDCs because the private agents and capital 
markets which are needed to undertake monitoring are themselves very poorly 
developed and because private sector monitoring is also constrained by the lack of 
reliable financial information. 
A number of interesting proposals for improving systems have been put 
forward, mainly involving incremental changes to the industrial country model, 
although as yet the efficacy of these ideas in LDCs is largely unproven.  If prudential 
reforms are to be effective in the conditions prevailing in LDCs, they need to be 
relatively simple, robust in terms of not being highly dependent upon other 
components of the prudential system working well, and easy to verify and enforce. 
Prudential reforms which could satisfy some or all of these criteria include 
adopting very strict bank licensing criteria with high entry requirements relating to 
minimum capital and the expertise and integrity of bank owners, directors and 
managers, raising minimum capital adequacy ratios above the minimum levels set 
out in the Basle Capital Accord, imposing very stringent restrictions on insider 
lending, and allowing regulators the discretion to imposing speed limits on growth of Colin Kirkpatrick  378
credit to high risk sectors.  Governments should avoid exacerbating moral hazard, by 
limiting depositor insurance to small deposits only.  Because regulatory forbearance 
is a major weakness in many LDCs, it is essential that future reforms strengthen the 
incentives on the regulators for effective supervision and enforcement of the 
prudential regulations at all stages of the regulatory process.  The introduction of 
prompt corrective action rules, which mandate intervention by the regulators in 
distressed banks when predetermined thresholds are crossed, could help to reduce 
regulatory forbearance.  PCA rules should be combined with measures which give 
regulators greater effective independence from political interference and which also 
strengthen  ex post requirements for disclosure of regulatory actions and 
accountability of the regulators. 
The recent history of financial crises in developing countries has clearly 
shown the critical importance of sound regulation and supervision, as a means of 
defending financial systems against distress and disorder, and the economic and 
social resulting from financial instability.  It is also clear that the appropriate 
regulation of financial markets is complex, and needs to recognise an economy’s 
structural characteristics, stage of development, and institutional capacities. 
 
CONCLUSION 
This paper has concentrated on the contribution that financial sector 
development can make to economic growth and poverty reduction in developing 
countries.  In particular, we have argued that robust prudential regulation of financial 
institutions is a necessary condition for stable and efficient financial sector 
development. 
It is not being suggested, however, that prudential regulation is all that is 
needed to achieve a significant reduction in poverty.  The limitations of the analysis 
need to be recognised. First, the causes of economic growth are multiple and 
interrelated, and our understanding of the way in which financial intermediation 
interacts with the other factors contributing to economic growth is still incomplete 
[Temple (1999); Luintel and Khan (1999)].  Second, the measure of poverty we have 
used is crude, measuring the prevalence of poverty by the headcount index, i.e. the 
number of people whose standard of living is below the absolute poverty line.  The 
measure does not allow for any changes that occur below the poverty line, where, for 
example, the remaining poor become poorer.  There will continue to be a need for 
safety nets and other forms of social protection, including financial services, to assist 
those poor people who lack the capabilities and endowments to take advantage of 
improved opportunities in a growing economy.  Third, we have not discussed the 
fragmented character of the formal financial sector in many developing countries, 
where, for example, legally registered microfinance institutions operate outside the 
regulation of the financial authorities [CGAP (2000); Christen and Rosenberg 
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Much more research is needed to advance our understanding of the crucial 
issues of financial development, economic growth and poverty reduction. The 
Institute for Development Policy and Management at the University of Manchester is 
engaging with this research agenda, through three separate research programmes, 
supported by the UK Department for International Development (DFID)—the 
Finance and Development Research Programme; the Research Centre for Regulation 
and Competition; and the Research Centre for Chronic Poverty and Development.  
All three programmes are seeking to work in partnership with developing country 
research institutions and individual researchers, and would welcome the opportunity 
of collaborating with the Pakistan Society of Development Economists. 
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This is an extensive paper with the ambitious objectives to “review the recent 
research contributions in the areas of finance, growth and development” and to “try to 
uncover what we know the contribution that financial sector development can make to 
poverty reduction”. Although these are difficult questions with complex synergies not 
fully understood, especially in the present environment of global interdependence, the 
author has made credible inroads and interesting insights into the field. 
The logic of the arguments presented and the conclusions drawn may be 
summarised as follows. A direct link between finance and poverty reduction was not 
easy to establish. Even in the case of the over-publicised area of micro finance, 
promoted as “a mean of directly linking finance and poverty reduction,” it is found to 
have concentrated on the technologies of improving access to credit rather than in 
measuring the impact on poverty. As the author rightly observed, improved access 
does not necessarily lead to poverty reduction. We may add that even then, the reach 
of micro finance is limited and its activities are mostly subsidised. Accordingly, the 
paper turns to investigate indirect links between finance and poverty reduction. 
The most obvious candidate is growth. There is enough evidence that indicate 
that growth ‘facilitates’ poverty reduction. Also, there is no reason to be concerned 
about the ‘Kuznets’ lag between growth and reduction in inequality. Recent evidence 
indicates that growth does not necessarily increase inequality in the initial stages. 
The Kuznets curve is not inevitable, although policy measures are required if 
economic growth is to deliver increased income and improved economic security to 
the poor. Thus the circle of the argument is closed if it is proved that there is a 
positive relation between financial sector development and economic growth. The 
author provides enough evidence to that effect and goes further to indicate that it is 
the weak financial sector performance that is responsible for the presence of weak 
positive synergies.  
The rest of the paper focuses on policies and programmes to enhance prudential 
reform of the financial sector especially in the developing countries. Meanwhile, 
policies required to rehabilitate micro finance, and more fundamental, those required 
for economic growth to improve income levels and economic security of the poor are 
left aside, probably because of lack of conceptual or empirical evidence. 
The extensive review of empirical evidence on prudential reform in the 
banking systems indicates the presence of serious weaknesses and the need for 
fundamental prudential reform specially in the developing countries. These 
conclusions led to detailed policy recommendations.  Comments  385
The logic of the argument and its conclusions, thus far, are clear but, I am 
afraid, suffer from apparently serious omissions, beyond those already mentioned, 
that influence the conclusions and recommendations. What is of concern is the 
implied assumption that prudential reform will lead to financial sector stability, 
essential for stable economic growth and accordingly poverty reduction. This is not 
necessarily the case in the present global environment. There is evidence that 
financial sectors around the world have been exposed to new types of local and 
global risk and a higher degree of potential failure. As discussed in Eatwell and 
Taylor (2000), these risks may not be alleviated by traditional prudential reforms on 
the local or national levels, or even by the present international regulatory agencies, 
e.g., the IMF, the European Central Bank or the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) 
of the European Monetary System.  [See also Sirageldin and Serageldin (2001)].  
The present international financial system is becoming highly complex and 
interdependent with many new technical innovations. This new financial 
environment started at the time when the USA abolished the Gold standard in the 
early 1970s and effectively started the process of the privatisation of financial risk. 
For the past three decades, financial institutions developed built-in instabilities with 
serious systemic risk that because of its contagious nature impact the performance of 
individual and collective financial institutions, regardless of their prudential behavior 
as well as national economic performance regardless of the quality of its 
fundamentals. The impact on growth and poverty reduction could be sizable as 
illustrated by the case of East Asia in the late 1990s and Turkey at the present time. 
These are critical issues that require attention to supplement the authors 
commendable survey and extensive agenda. 
 
Ismail Sirageldin 
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  (a) I have read this paper with interest and benefited from the views expressed 
in it. Prof. Kirkpatrick has underlined the importance of the role of 
Financial Market in Economic Growth and its consequent impact on 
Poverty Reduction in LDCs. 
   The paper reports the empirical evidence that “higher levels of financial 
development are significantly correlated with faster economic growth, 
physical capital accumulation and economic efficiency improvements” (p. 
5). 
  (b) It is fairly well known that financial sector development contributes to 
economic growth provided the financial sector supports capital 
accumulation and technological innovation. 
  (c) The author hypothesises that greater economic benefit would accrue from 
‘regulated’ rather than ‘liberal’ financial markets, that it would help avoid 
financial crises like that of 1980s’ and 1990s, and also be instrumental in 
poverty reduction in the LDCs. 
  (d) He also says that “financial liberalisation has led to an increase in financial 
fragility and systematic crises in developing countries’ financial sector” (p. 
3). Therefore, it seems appropriate to follow prudential regulations like 
those prevalent in the USA and that rigorous implementation of Prudential 
Regulations will discipline the domestic financial markets leading to 
ultimate poverty reduction. 
  (e) In hindsight, one can say with confidence that adopting the US model of 
prudential systems for banks, without modifications, for LDC’s was 
inappropriate as is clear from what happened later on to banks in 1990s. 
One may ask: could the weaknesses identified in this paper been avoided? 
Why were these weaknesses/possible consequences not spotted earlier? Are 
these ‘weaknesses’ found only when the model is applied to the LDC’s or 
do they exist as loop-holes when the model is used in the more developed 
countries? Besides, the high incidence of banking crisis in industrialised 
countries also suggests that their ‘regulatory’ methodology should not be 
regarded as “international best practice”. 
  (f) Is it possible that these very factors such as ‘overstated capital levels’ 
‘insufficient covering for losses in the belief that they would not happen’ 
actually lead to the phenomenal East-Asian growth before? After all, the 
same ‘liberal’ financial system had been in place when growth rates were 
around 7 to 11 percent? So if the regulations allowed economic growth at 
that time why did the bubble burst later?  And secondly, what role did world Comments  387
financial system play in the financial crisis faced by the East Asian 
countries? 
  (g) It is fairly well known that the Prudential Regulations lay down the required 
ratios between the liabilities and the capital and between risk assets and the 
capital to ensure good financial health of the financial institutions which 
maybe able to absorb any possible bad debts or the extended troughs in the 
business cycle. The Prudential Regulations also lay down the criteria for 
asset evaluation and prudence required in making investment. 
  (h) Strict adherence to Prudential Regulations will thus reduce the incidence of 
failure of the financial institutions and will eliminate the instability and 
political repercussions such an event may cause. 
  — Now the correlation between Prudential Regulations and Poverty 
Alleviation maybe present due to their salutary effect on the economic 
climate, but it is very weak and remote. 
  (i) One may ask: Will putting down too many regulations actually lead to 
financial repression and thus break the chain of economic growth and 
poverty alleviation? Hindsight is always 20-20 and it is easier after the East-
Asian crises to say ‘oh that is why it happened’, so let us control every 
factor which might have been responsible! Sounds more like finding a scape 
goat rather than setting up a better financial system. 
  (j) Regulatory forbearance issue also deserves further analysis. If the “Zombie” 
banks cannot be resurrected, is supervisor the best person to try and play it 
safe? Let the central bank decide, because bank closures have far reaching 
effects, political and economic. The supervisor should not be making this 
decision in the first place. 
  (k) Moreover, though increasing Capital Requirements will strengthen the 
bank, but will this not limit the amount of money available for ‘lending’ and 
thus, from an overall all viewpoint, decrease the amount of capital available 
in the market for economic growth and hence lead to increase in poverty. 
  (l) A better regulation would be to ensure that the banking system is able to 
appropriately manage it’s capital rather than hang on to more for “just-in-
case” situations. 
   Tighter lending restrictions are liable to cause the small-borrower to loose 
out more, as the bank will tend to lend to those who can provide securities, 
leaving out those who cannot i.e. the poor. That would defeat the idea of 
poverty reduction. 
 (m)  ‘Speed limit’ for sectors may also effect micro-financing, which seems to 
bring some good results. Even with where/when to apply speed limits, this 
sort of control will dampen the prospects of investment available to an 
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  (n) The provision of micro credit in Bangladesh has been instrumental in 
poverty alleviation even though provision of such loans without adequate 
collateral would be considered a violation of Prudential Regulations. 
  (o) So much so that banks are finding investment even in the Information 
Technology sector very risky despite the fact that this market has great 
growth potential. The obvious problem in this case is that computer 
machine looses its value very fast and the assets are depreciated at a rate 
that are unacceptable by prudential regulation criteria. So what options are 
open to LDC banks in a situation of conflicting interests: follow the 
prudential regulations or take the investment opportunities? 
  (p) Acceptance of author’s recommendations will also create a serious dilemma 
for the managers of economy: how to choose a good mix of free flow of 
finance for investment for all sectors without invoking the restrictions 
linked to prudential regulations. Any policy decision in such circumstances 
will be tedious exercise, thus fraught with economic risks. 
  (q) Over all, with the regulations being suggested, the chances for improving 
the banking system will improve, but the adverse effects of these 
regulations will tend to be on the poor than the rich. A typical LDC bank 
having to work with such regulations may become biased in favour of his 
rich customers rather than cater to the small borrowers. That would defeat 
the entire purpose of poverty alleviation. 
  (r) If the banks are more regulated, and ‘liberalisation’ dampened in favour of 
‘stability’, then that too is a contribution towards economic growth, but this 
growth may lead to income inequality rather than poverty elevation. The 
author has made some good recommendations for improved banking in 
LDCs, but how this will lead towards poverty elevation is unclear. 
  (s) “Pro-poor” financial development sounds great, but how do you actually 
make it work? The paper says that income inequality has worsened. If you 
have public policy to remove market imperfections, does that not first give 
more opportunity to those above the poverty line than those below? Market 
imperfections cannot disappear in a short period and so the time it takes for 
them to be removed will (probably) increase the rich-poor gap further. 
  (t) Besides, it is difficult to see lack of access to markets as the only major 
reason for the poor being poor. There are many other factors involved in 
this problem. 
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